EU MIGRATION POLICIES
AND THEIR OUTCOME – THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

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Abstract

Immigration has been an important subject in Europe ever since the early 1960s. But recently, it became a crucial political subject for most EU countries, changing public policies, while fueling extremists. Today, we are witnessing one of the biggest immigration crises in Europe, due to the Syrian conflict. Despite having regulations regarding immigration, the access being stress less for EU citizens and citizens originated from countries with whom EU has agreements, or is difficult, even impossible, for the rest, EU has been taken over by hundreds of thousands of migrants fleeing war and poverty. EU has had a hard time managing the situation, showing a lack of unity, direction and strategy. Therefore, a question arises: why the more the EU and its members do, in terms of migration policy, to limit migration the less they manage to improve the situation, to uphold their policy goal? The focus will be on political factors and globalization. In conclusion, we need: willingness to take steps to widen the "North-South development gap"; a united EU long term migration policy and for the gap between the most developed EU countries and the least to decrease, for the migration burden to be sustained fairly.

Keywords

Syrian crises, EU, ISIS, policy, Merkel, globalization.

Introduction

Migration was, is and most likely will always be a complex social phenomenon that shapes societies. Let's consider the effects historical migration flows had in Europe in both Roman and the "Barbarian" societies. Then, think about what we are witnessing today, population movements within Europe and from outside, but also, what could follow in the near future, at least.

For instance, The Barbarian Invasion (360-800 AD) was a period of vastly intensified military backed migratory movements. It changed the Roman and the "barbaric" worlds, involving the Germanic tribes, at first. Then, the Germanic tribes where pushed West by Slavs, Huns etc. Later on, invasions where caused by tribes from the North, Viking invasion for instance and much later the Mongols from the east.

Onwards, the effects of EU enlargements on "old" Europe – from 2004, 2007 and 2013 – are vast, of course, migration for economic reasons, being very important, both for origin and destination societies. Since, the level of economic development of the new EU members was, at the time of accession, lower than the EU average and much lower than the EU countries sitting at the top, migration for work, at the beginning, was very appealing even if we are to consider only the income gap. Wave 2004 had an average GPD/capita of 66.5% of EU's GDP/capita average, wave 2007 had an average of 41% GPD/capita of EU's GDP/capita average and last Croatia had in 2013 a GPD/capita 61% of EU's average GPD/capita. (Eurostat) This pressure, especially on the labor market, created much controversy and a major political and economic issue in the EU. As a side note, we are now observing the same

type of debate in the CEE and SE countries regarding the influx of refugees and immigrants for economic reasons from Syria, Turkey, Africa in general etc.

How will the recent population movements shape, if at all, the future EU? and what will happen to the Schengen area? – are valid questions. Why did the migration policies of EU and specifically of members like Greece, Italy, Hungary, Croatia, GERMANY fail to prevent the uncontrollable flow of migrants and what can be done to improve it in the future?

To respond to these questions, we will be using the available data – documents, statistics, media, research articles etc. – in a critical and analytical fashion, with theoretical support offered by the major migration theories.

Identifying the causes should lead to finding solutions to improve the situation rather than building walls to seal EU borders!

1. Literature review

1. Aras N., Mencutek Z. in the article *The international migration and foreign policy nexus: The case of Syrian refugee crisis and Turkey*, from 2015, analyze the connection between "foreign" and "immigration and asylum" policies in regard to the refugee influx towards Turkey due to the Syrian conflict. The authors argue that the bold external policy of Turkey, willingly being the stabilization force in the Middle East, led to the "open door" and humanitarian asylum policy at the initial stages of refugee flow. But, Turkish foreign isolation policy and the continual flow of refugees – about 1.6 million refugees today – forced the Turkish government to reevaluate their foreign policy on the refugee crisis into one focused on "non-arrival" and "security", underlining, only, "temporary protection" and suggesting "voluntary return" and "burden share"', even, placing some of this burden on EUs hands.

2. Koca, B. in the article *Deconstructing Turkey's "open door" policy towards refugees from Syria*, from 2015, analyzes, in depth, "the open door" policy towards refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war. The author claims that even though this policy has been followed by a "humanitarian discourse" about allowing refugees in and offering them shelters, and has been widely applauded and welcomed outside and inside Turkey, has not been critically examined as needed. He concludes that the Syrian refugees have been securitized and such practices that violate the non-refoulement principle – which means that all refugees, without any kind of discrimination, are not to be sent back to be persecuted – and human rights in general. Also, the author underlines EUs responsibility in this matter, stating that the current policy contributes to the human tragedies across the Mediterranean. As a side note, Turkey might be using this migration valve, allowing them or not to reach EU land, for political reasons.

3. Matichescu M. et. al. in the article *The Romanian Migration: Development of the Phenomenon and the Part Played by the Immigration Policies of European Countries*, from 2015, explored the Romanian migration in Europe under the influence of migration policies. They assess the migration type, the factors determining the Romanian emigration and the way Romanians choose the work destination country. The research is based on data provided by Romanian National Institute of Statistics through the Opinion Barometer, official statistic of other European countries on immigration etc. The authors determined, by using two algorithms, where Romanian migration was highest and the way the destination was chosen, thus, the wage gap and the permissibility of existent migration policies – in the destination countries – where found to be main factors that influenced the evolution of Romanian emigration in the EU. Also, they conclude that political factors have a bigger influence on migration than the wage gap.

4. Castles S., Haas, Miller M. in the book *The age of migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Fifth Edition, from 2014, offer an extensive coverage of

regional migration analysis, but also global effects of migration. Castles is a Research Professor of Sociology at the University of Sydney (Australia), Hein de Hass is Lecturer in Migration Studies at University of Oxford/Professor of Migration and Development at Maastricht University (Netherlands) and Mark J. Millers is Professor of Political Sciences and International Relations at Delaware University (USA). They go through: the challenges of global migration; contemporary trends; global migration and governance; ethnic diversity, racism and multiculturalism; migration theories; the way migration transforms societies; migration before WW2; migration after WW2; migration in the Americas; migration in the Asia-Pacific; migration in Africa and the Middle East; migration, security and the debate on climate change; the quest of control; migrants and minorities in the labor force; ethnic minorities and society; immigrants and politics; conclusion: migration is the twenty-first century with future perspectives, ways to improve international cooperation, responding to irregular immigration, legal immigration and integration, ethnic diversity, social change and nation-state.

5. Russell K. in *Theories and typologies of migration: an overview and a primer*, from 2013, reviews most theories regarding migration, targeting the student population, emphasizing the interdisciplinary approach to migration studies. He goes through the push-pull theory and the neoclassical thesis, migration and development transitions, historical-structural and political economy models, the role of system and networks, the 'new economics' of migration and finally approaches based on 'transnational turn' in migration studies. He concludes this review with some future challenges for the migration theorizers: connecting migration theory with globalization and with results from qualitative research, personal journals and biographies; explaining why people do not migrate and access to mobility as a differentiating factor of social class; underlining the existential and emotional dimensions of migration.

6. Anghel R. and Horvath I. (coordinators) in the book *Migration Sociology. Theories and Romanian study cases*, from 2009, offer an in depth analysis of the Romanian migration but also a review of migration theories. (globalization, transnationalism, the changes imposed by communication development and transport and so on)

7. Castles S. in the article *Why migration policies fail*, from 2004, analyzes the connection between the negative outcomes of migratory policies of states and supranational bodies, regarding the goals they state to follow, in connection with the root causes of migration, rather than concentrating on ways to stop the flows. He emphasizes the factors deriving from the social dynamics of the migratory process, factors linked to globalization – the North-South divide – and factor arising within the political system, while subtly pointing on hidden agendas in national policies regarding migration. In his vision, EU governance, and other entities, may "say" one thing – policy wise – but actually, follow other political goals. Thus, both the countries of origin and destination are depended on migrants, the first may even stop most development and base their evolution on remissions, while the second may try to exploit the migrants by pushing many towards a gray area, therefore making them cheaper on the labor market. He concludes that migration policies might have better outcomes if the migration process was viewed in its depth, if the strategies where long term, rather than short term and if the North-South divide in prosperity would be addressed.

2. Migration theories
Migration should, always, be considered as part of a bigger picture. Migration is linked to economic development, social change and to the intensification of interconnectivity between different places in ways that the doings made many miles away affect home affairs and the other way around, too. Therefore, it cannot be narrowed down, only, to a coping mechanism

for scarcity and space balancing, as some theories suggest, because, growth processes, also, drive migration by strengthening the abilities and longing to move.

Migration can also be conceptualized as a self-driven process fed by the mechanics of social networks and knowledge transfer. Such inner-dynamics mediate migration and determine the creation of settler communities in destination countries. Members of these immigrant communities have multiple identities – they are, still, connected with those left home – and this results in money and idea transfers to origin countries, which, in exchange provides a way to survive and foster for those left back home – at a micro level – and can, even, become – at a macro level – the predominant economic growth factor for some origin societies. Thus, they make migration difficult to control for receiving countries, enabling migrants to go around and under the governmental imposed limitations.

Migration is, still, influenced by political factors – in the receiving and origin societies –, by economic development and/or by labour offer and demand. Such forces can damage the social networks – that use to drive the migratory process – and this explains why not all people migrate, why some migrants are more helpful than others to those who wish to emigrate too – the bridgeheads can, sometimes, become gatekeepers, when, for instance, pressures related to job findings, in developed receiving countries, come to play, during economic crisis, or to governmental restrictions imposed to immigrants etc.

The movement from origin to a destination society is a complex process and it can take a long time to complete, also, the socio-economic effects affecting migrants can pass through generations and, even, bypass death – for instance when the body of a deceased member of a migrant family is being returned home for funeral – which underlines, yet again, that migration is the work of a group of people, usually suffered, sustained and benefiting the nuclear and/or extended family, being caused by socio-economic and political context, in both origin and destination societies. These effects can, sometimes, change the plans migrants have set up for their future, like when the receiving country is changed, due to governmental anti-immigration policies which can end up shaping the negative public feeling towards migrants – scapegoating – and this can make integration harder for them, but also, migration strategies change when networks fall apart etc.

Classic views consider migration to be driven by income, jobs and other opportunities differences between the North and the South. In the first place, these views do not explain why many poor people do not migrate to wealthier countries, while, in the highly developed industrialized societies – receiving societies - high immigration, notable emigration and internal migration does happen in the same time. Often, economic development, in conjunction with transport and communication evolution, increases migration, since, human aspiration and migratory capabilities raise as well. Still, there is no doubt global inequalities in life quality play an important role explaining migration causes. Therefore, both – development and poverty – boost migration, but do not fully explain it, emphasizing the complexity of the migration processes.

The migratory processes gather up complex set of factors and their interconnections cause and shape migration. Migration studies are interdisciplinary and they involve sociology, economics, political science, history, geography etc.

The paradigms dominating migration research are functionalist and historical-structural theories. The former foresees society as a system which blends a collection of interconnected individuals, resembling – in structure – a living organism, in which there is an inclination towards equilibrium. Therefore, functionalist migration theory, more often than not, perceives migration as a positive occurrence serving all those involved and generating greater equality within and among societies. The latter, entrenched in neo-Marxist political economy and sociology, is focused on the way socio-economic, cultural and political structures force

and manipulate the way social actors act in such fashion it mostly creates and strengthens disequilibrium, rather than forging equilibrium. Thus, historical-structuralism stresses the negative effects migrants face in destination countries, as they are viewed as being cheap and exploitable workforce in the interests of the wealthy, but also, migration is guilty for the brain drain effect in the origin societies, resulting in greater geographical inequality between North and South.

Newer theoretical approaches, based on living style and economics, explain migration in the developing societies in relation with inequality and economic crisis. In these views, the political, in the destination countries, can only regulate the inputs and the outputs at the borders, but these policies, alone, have a hard time controlling flows. In such cases there is a real need to cooperate with the origin states, which could, on their end, try to improve the life quality of their population using macroeconomic policies like tax reductions, public health reforms, state pensions etc., this being the case of Central and Eastern Europe and South Eastern European countries and their EU integration

Theories focused on the labour market picture migration as being led by the need of immigrant labour in developed capitalist societies: the need for a cheap and easy to manipulate, in order to exploit, work force. This magnetic force prays on the irregular migrants – immigrants looking for temporary work – and in combination with the migration networks can, often, disregard state migration policies in their search for profits, but also in order to keep prices for products low.

The migration policies cannot determine, alone, the way migration happens, but maybe other types of policies – like policies aiming to reduce the global inequalities – states and super body could take, would impact migration and lead to better outcomes, in the developed societies, for the population affected by the cheaper influx of labour.

Different theories function at distinct levels of analysis. Furthermore, the various theories focus on different aspects of migration, and even if they cannot be combined, still, they all offer important perspectives into different happenings in society.

2.1. Migration industry

Understanding migrant networks is important for decoding the reasoning behind why migration at times becomes in part a self-powered phenomenon and why it can become hard to control.

Another term that embraces the people and institutions with an interest in organizing migration movements in order to earn their living is the `migratory industry'. In this category we can include travel agents, work recruiters, brokers, translators, hosing agents, legal advisors, human smugglers – like the coyotes who guide the Mexican workers across the Rio Grande – counterfeiters, banks that offer transfer facilities for remittances, mobile phone operators offering special deals for migrants etc.

In time the `migration industry' can be the number one force behind migratory movement. In such times, governmental and super national bodies that make and enforce migration policies can run counter to the interests of the agents involved in migration. This can make migration very hard to control. Harris describes is as "a vast unseen international network underpinning a global labour market; a horde of termites…boring through the national fortifications against migration and changing whole societies".

2.2. Human smuggling and tariffing

Strictly managing immigration through tougher migration policies and border controls can lead to an increased reliance of migrants on smuggling. If the dependence on these migration agents becomes very high, then this process can shape into a dangerous from called human tariffing.

Women and young girls are most vulnerable to trafficking and they account for 80% of all victims, 87% of this cases involving sexual exploitation, while 28% involved forced work.

Imprisonment, deportation and even death are risks faced by irregular migrants, like the Syrian refugees transcending the sea, while the leaders of this smuggling operation are hardly, ever, apprehended.

Morrison sustains that increased restrictive measures in EU cause greater demand for traffickers, even though some of these migrants may even have valid reasons to apply for refugee status. Similar effects have been noticed in the US, where, by disturbing the modus operandi and traditional routes of smugglers and by the increased border enforcement the fees for smuggling have risen, also the number deaths among migrants, but not the number of illegal works arriving.

3. Refugees, asylum seekers

In recent years, the number of refugees has risen globally, after a slight decrease in the late 90's. Rightwing politicians, but also some tabloids, have warned about the possible consequences of this growth, such as a strong increase of crime rate, fundamentalist terrorism and exploitation of the social protection system. Still, the numbers show that less than 20% of refugees are in the developed world seeking asylum, or being granted asylum, most being in Africa, Middle East, Asia and Latin America. Therefore, calls for border policy reforms, arrest of asylum seekers and faster processing and deportation seem excessive.

Refugees are immigrants forced to migrate by the living conditions in their homeland – such as trying to flee persecution, military conflict, discrimination etc. – and these distinguish them from the economic migrants. But, economic migrants can also experience this type of constrains, to some degree, in their homelands, also the refugees can have some freedom of choice too, like accumulating resources to leave their origin countries. At the end of 2015, according to UNHCR, 42.9 million people are trying to escape violence and persecution globally, a staggering increase of 7.1 million people, since 2014.

By international law, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person residing outside of the origin country, a person who is either incapable or not willing to return because of well-founded fear of oppression on grounds of race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, politics, gender and sex, affiliation to a certain group. By now, many UN members signed this convention, 148 out of 193, and obligated themselves to give shelter to refugees, but also, to respect the non-refoulement principle which states that they – the refugees – are not to be returned to a country where they may be persecuted further, yet, in practice, this principle isn't always followed.

Some asylum seekers are allowed to resettle from countries of first asylum to other countries – like the US, Canada, Australia, New Zeeland, Scandinavian countries etc. – that can, actually, offer them long-term assistance.

The migrants that crossed the international borders of their country in search for shelter from oppression, but whose claims have not yet been processed, are called asylum seekers. On the other hand, those persons who are in danger and fled their homes, but have not manage to cross international borders, are called international displaced persons. Unlike refugees and refugee seekers, IPDs, are still in danger, they are exposed to hunger and disease during their exoduses. There are over 24 million IPDs in 2015, according to UNHCR.

3.1 Migration and migration policies in Europe

EU member states stance on migration varied in time.

In the '80s asylum seekers were coming directly to Western Europe and US from conflict zones around the globe. Later on, in the '90s waves arrived from Albania into Italy in 1991 and 1997, from the former Yugoslavia during the war but, also, later, from Kosovo. Furthermore, an estimated 1.3 million Roma, originated from Romania and Bulgaria, arrived in Germany and France. German ethnic minorities from Central and Eastern Europe countries returned home and undocumented workers from Poland and Ukraine reached the Northern Europe.

Table 1 Top 5 migration-origin countries between 1990 and 2000.

	Time period	Origin country	Amount
1	1990-2000	Former Yugoslavia	0.86 mil
2	1990-2000	Romania	0.40 mil
3	1990-2000	Turkey	0.36 mil
4	1990-2000	Iraq	0.21 mil
5	1990-2000	Afghanistan	0.15 mil

Source: The UN Refugee Agency – www.unhcr.org

The EU member states responded to the influx by strengthening the migration policies: legislation changes aimed to restrict the access to the refugee status; people fleeing the war from the former Yugoslavia where given only temporary refugee protection, instead of permanent refugee status; for people without proper documents non-arrival policies where put in place, more countries needed visas to enter Western Europe; returning asylum seekers to transit countries; not granting asylum for people fleeing persecution of non-state actors like the Taliban; European cooperation increased on asylum and migration policies through the Schengen Conversion, the 1990 Dublin Convention and it's new form from 2003 the Dublin Regulation etc.

Other ideas, in regard of migration policies, came from the UK government who had a "new vision" for refugee protection with the main focus being to keep the migrants in their region by setting up protection areas there - an idea that even today is offered as a solution for Syrian refugee crisis – and to set up transit centers abroad, outside EU borders. These ideas raised serious concerns about human right violations if put in practice.

The Italian government started to return boats with migrants to Libya, where asylum seekers where constrained and refused access to the legal process. In 2012, this action lead to sanctions from the European Court of Human Rights who ordered Italy to pay compensation, 15,000 Euros per capita, to 24 Somali and 200 Eritrean asylum seekers, returned by Italy, to Libya back in 2009.

With the notable exception of Sweden (EU) and Norway (EEA) European countries have not taken much part in the international refugee resettlements.

But, migration policy only started to concern EU, in legal and political terms, since 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam which integrated into the EU body of law all the migration legislation made by member states of the Schengen Agreement. This involved a common – EU – legal and political approach in matters like visas, asylum, immigration and other issues related to the free movement of people. Furthermore, The Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007 and ratified in 2009, completed the political and legal inclusion of the migration policies within EU treaty framework.

Table 2 Asylum seekers arrivals over time in EU25+Norway (2002-2012)

Period	Amount asylum seekers arrivals
2002	0.39 mil
2006	0.18 mil
2007	0.20 mil
2010	0.25 mil
2012	0.28 mil

Source: OECD

3.2 EU freedom movement

Article 48 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome – which created the common market – also stated that workers from member countries can move freely if they find jobs in another member state. In 1950s, the Italian government was interested in fostering these employment opportunities for its many unemployed citizens. But, by the time article 48 came into effect, in 1968, Italy's unemployment problem wasn't so big anymore, due to the economic development sustained by EU structural funds. Very little labour migration was noted from Italy to other EU member states.

Important debates on labour mobility rose in the mid-1980s, in EU, by the accession of Portugal and Spain to the Union. Fears of a missive wave of workers flooding EU's labour market appeared on the surface. Still, after the 7 years of transition this influx of workers did not happen, instead both Spain and Portugal economies became destination for economic migrants.

The labour inter-mobility of EU remained quite low – despite fears – on account of the movement of capital towards the newly integrated countries.

In 1985, the Schengen Agreement was signed and it created a borderless space in Europe in which members of the agreement could move freely. It was originally signed by France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and The Netherlands.

Then, the 1986, the Single European Act followed, and it defined the single market as an area without borders where goods, persons, services and capital cloud move freely.

In 1995, the Schengen Agreement finally came into force, but the border elimination was compensated by the creation of the Schengen Information System, a network of information meant to enhance cooperation between states on matters like transnational crime and terrorism.

Later, other countries joined the Schengen area, like: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, UK, Ireland, but also Norway (non-EU member).

Still, labour mobility restriction were placed on Central and Eastern European countries that joined EU on the 2004 expansion wave by most EU members, with the exception of UK, Ireland and Sweden. This opening led to a surprising increase in labour mobility – 0.70 million workers – towards UK, originated, mostly, from Poland.

Germany lifted movement and labour restriction, agreed previously, for the new EU countries on account of the EC report on transnational procedures from 2006, which underlined the positive effects of free movement on the economic and labour markets, for the countries which, already, had relaxed the labour mobility policies.

Still, the same fears and policies appeared and where enforced with the 2007 enlargement wave, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU.

3.3 Forced migration global trends

Refugee population was only 2.4 million in 1975, but increased to 18.2 million refugees by 1993. By 2005 it declined to 8.7 million. After which, the trend started to increase yet again reaching in 2006 9.9 million, due to the Iraq conflict. The trend continued on this path, therefore, the refugee population in 2011 it was 10.4 million, in 2012 was 15.4, in 2013 was 16.7 million, in 2014 was 19,5 million. This trend will continue to rise, most likely, in 2015 as well, on account of the Syrian conflict.

Table 3 World's main refugee-origin and refugee-receiving countries Mid 213, End-213, Mid-2014

No.	Origin country	Mid-2013	End-2013	Mid-2014		Receiving country	Mid-2013	End-2013	Mid-2014
1	Syria	1.8 mil	2.5 mil	3 mil	1	Pakistan	1.6 mil	1.6 mil	1.6 mil
2	Afghanistan	2.6 mil	2.6 mil	2.7 mil	2	Lebanon	0.57 mil	0.85 mil	1.1 mil
3	Somalia	1.15 mil	1.15 mil	1.1 mil	3	Iran	0.86 mil	0.86 mil	0.98 mil
4	Sudan	0.63 mil	0.65 mil	0.67 mil	4	Turkey	0.51 mil	0.61 mil	0.82 mil
5	South Sudan	0.03 mil	0.15 mil	0.59 mil	5	Jordan	0.61 mil	0.64 mil	0.73 mil
6	Congo	0.51 mil	0.49 mil	0.49 mil	6	Ethiopia	0.41 mil	0.43 mil	0.59 mil
7	Myanmar	0.41 mil	0.48 mil	0.47 mil	7	Kenya	0.55 mil	0.53 mil	0.54 mil
8	Iraq	0.75 mil	0.41 mil	0.43 mil	8	Chad	0.42 mil	0.43 mil	0.45 mil
9	Columbia	0.39 mil	0.39 mil	0.40 mil	9	Uganda	0.16 mil	0.26 mil	0.40 mil
10	Central African Republic	0.06 mil	0.19 mil	0.39 mil	10	China	0.30 mil	0.30 mil	0.30 mil

Source: The UN Refugee Agency – www.unhcr.org

Most refugees are forced to migrate by war and the confusion that follows. For instance, military conflicts happened in Afghanistan and Iraq, part of the "War on terror". Also, a considerable number of receiving countries are quite poor. Thus, refuge waves are generated in and near the conflict zones and for the most part they remain in the vicinity of those regions. Only those who have sufficient resources manage to cross international borders.

3.4 Syrian refugee crisis effects in Europe

As **Table 3** shows Syria has become the main refugee source, since mid-2014, and this trend continues all the way through 2015. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan received most of this influx. By 2015, the estimated number of refugees originated from Syria reached 4 million people, around 95% being hosted in just 5 countries: Iraq with 3 million; Turkey with 1.9 million; Lebanon with 1.2 million; Jordan with 0.65 million; Egypt with 0.13 million. With over 220,000 people already killed in the Syrian conflict there are still 12.8 million people left

who are in need of assistance, this making the total number of displaced people in Syria ~50% of the entire population.

Turkey now hosts over 2.2 million refugees. As the situation evolved – more Syrians that held sufficient resources – started to migrate towards EU by crossing the Mediterranean Sea towards Greece and Italy. It's estimated that around 0.8 million arrived on EU territory by 5 November 2015 with 0.66 million entered through Greece and 0.14 million entered through Italy. The Greek authorities estimate that around 0.025 million people arrived only in the last month (from October to November 2015), furthermore IOM (International Organization for Migration) estimates that 0.20 million arrived in Greece by October during the entire year 2015. As a result of this rapid influx 7 shipwrecks happened in only 1 week.

The migrants are on their way towards Northern Europe, UK and Sweden and over 0.21 million moved from Greece and Italy to the throughout Yugoslavia and Macedonia towards their desired destination. Daily arrival estimates, in former Yugoslavia, are in the vicinity of 7000.

Some 0.15 million crossed the Hungarian borders, on the way North, until the gates closed. Then, Slovenia witnessed an increase in the number of refugee arrivals, as for 4 November 2015 0.14 million. Furthermore, the Croatian Government announced afterwards that over 0.31 million immigrants arrived on its territory in only 3 months, with an influx of around 8000 migrants per day.

Refugee arrivals in Germany this year are of 0.6 million, but they may expect over 1.5 million refugees in total this year, from a previously estimated 0.8 million, having around 7000-10000 migrants crossing the German borders daily.

But, the refugee situation in Syria may even get more chaotic after the Russian intervention, UNHCR reporting that 0.12 million Syrians have been internally displaced since its start.

4. EU response to the Syrian refugee crisis

The EU recognize: the severity of this crisis, due to the sudden rise in number of people who are force to flee their home in order to escape violence and seek refuge abroad; the difficulties faced by EU countries – situated at Mediterranean Sea – in dealing with the influx of refugees; difficulties faced by EU countries of transit; difficulties faced by refugee receiving countries; difficulties faced by EU partners dealing with the crisis.

From May till September 2015, despite having been perceived by the public as being weak, the EU took specific measures to help ease the situation, some of the results are: by tripling its presence at the sea EU saved over 0.12 million lives; the EU allocated over 70 million Euros from EU funds in support for affected Member States, on top of the 7 billion euros multiannual funding allocated to members over 2014-2020 to support their efforts in dealing with migration and border management; EU increased its efforts in dealing with smugglers and to dismantle human trafficking groups, leading in a decrease in trafficking in August 2015, the Central Mediterranean route being stabilized at around 0.15 mil refugees, which is the same as August 2014; EU also is the number one donor in the global effort to alleviate the Syrian refugee crisis, around 4 billion euros have been mobilized by EC and Member States in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilization assistance to Syrians in their country and to refugees and their host communities in the region like in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt. Also, 1.8 billion euros have been allocated from EU's financial means to set up a trust fund meant to address the root causes of irregular migration from Africa; EU has committed on resettling over 0.022 million people from outside Europe in solidarity with their neighbors; last but not least, with the adoption of the EC's second relocation proposal, Member States obliged to reallocate 0.16 million people in clear need of international protection from the most affected Member States.

In response to the continual refugee crisis, the EU, planned specific action to be undertaken in the next 6 months. They can be divided into 3 categories: operational, budgetary and legal measures.

The operational measures are: the creation of migration management support teams in order to help EU Member States in dealing with the refugee crisis, these teams are set up to work in partnership with Member State national authorities; trigger the Civil Protection Mechanism or Rapid Border Intervention Teams in support of EU Member States; The EU Civil Protection Mechanism can be called to mobilize various types of assistance, teams and equipment, shelter, medical supplies etc.; Member State can request the deployment of Rapid border intervention teams to provide immediate border guard in cases of urgent or exceptional migratory pressure; normalization of the Schengen area and lifting internal border controls; intensifying diplomatic offensive and cooperation with third countries.

The budgetary measures are: increasing the emergency funding for most affected Member States, EU intending to offer another 100 million Euros for this fund; increasing the funding of three relevant EU agencies by 1.6 million Euros (Frontex, EASO, Europol); restoring funding for food via the World Food Programme to what it was in 2014; increase aid for Africa, the 1,8 billion Euros fund.

The legal measures are: recognizing that the implementation of the EU asylum legislation is poor, EC took 40 infringement decision against 19 Member States; EC will work with Greek authorities to normalize in the next 6 months the situation since Dublin transfers where suspending in 2010, Greece has to ensure adequate personnel for the Asylum Service and to improve the refugee reception.

To conclude the EU has prepared a 4-point plan that could "bear the test of time" in dealing with irregular immigration: protecting the EU borders by strengthening Frontex, establishing a European Border and Cost Guard; a long-term, EU-wide system or resettlement and reallocation; a credible and effective return policy; opening legal channels for migration.

Conclusions

The capacity of national states and supra national bodies – in our quest and in our case the EU – to regulate, control and intervene in international migration is of vital importance, but also seems to be a very difficult to undertake. On one hand, there is an increasing opening towards highly skilled workers – which is demanded by labour market – and on the other hand, there is greater restrictiveness towards low skilled workers, even though markets are looking for cheaper hands in the developed world. This may sound puzzling, but is not really, publicly leaders have to step up and protect the most vulnerable citizens. Also, the lower skilled immigrant work force will work for less if their legal status is in the gray area and will have to rely more on the migration industry to get there. While, the super skilled workers are a lot harder to exploit, having others means and resources at their disposal. But, controlling migration should not be seen as the very top priority for governments, since the vast majority of migrants actually do move in accordance with the law, and become illegal only after visa expiration.

The EU action plan on the Syrian refugee crisis, the quest to control the population influx, through the Mediterranean Sea, focuses on border control, managing the refugee population within Member Stats, boosting the World Food Programme etc.

The EU action plan lacks a long-term vision focused on the complexity of migration processes. No action plan to stop or contribute to the ending of the Syrian conflict, which is the cause of this exoduses. No strategy to help widen the differences between the poor countries in Africa and EU Member States, just some money promised to a fund. No legal action against those using these cheap migrant work force in EU, especially in agriculture

etc. The effects of the EU agenda on migration, of these measures can too often have strange outcomes in some EU Member States, like Romania – for instance – where displaced migrants may end up earning more than Romanian citizens, who are also EU citizens. How will these migrants integrate in the local economy having money given to them? Most likely they will use these resources to reach Germany and the Northern EU states making the EU reallocation of refugees to less developed EU states impractical.

Also, the goals established for the Greek authorities seam out of sync with their economic health. Not to mention the fact that no other EU state was able to stop and control migration flow, further down on the transit chain.

We should take into account the European demographic problems when we analyzing the EU stances on the Syrian refugee crisis. For example, Germany has lost 1.4 million people in the last 10 years, despite all the migratory inputs it had. Italy, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Croatia, UK are in the top 10 of nation with the highest percentage of people aged above age of 60 in their total population, first place is held by Japan.

Furthermore, the theory tells us that the migrants reaching EU will usually be those with at least some kind access to resources – the poorer remain in the camps around Syria – which means they most likely are also highly educated and can contribute to the local economy.

An investigation conducted on twitter concluded that the image of the dead Syrian boy found drowned on Turkeys shores changed the way many people perceived the Syrian migrants, from economic migrants to refugees in need of assistance. Overall, the EU, Merkel and the other leaders seem to have acted on emotions, rather than long-term planning, the measures undertaken are rather defensive and reactive, thus, are unlikely to put a stop to the irregular migration flows.

Notes

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